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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA..q
SHARRON KATHLEEN ROBERTSON,

)
)
Plaintiff and Respondant,)
)
-vs)
)
DONALD LEE ROBERTSON,
)
)
Defendant and Appellant. )

Civil No. 15719

BRIEF OF RESPONDANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondant adopts Appellant's characterization of
the nature of the case.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted plaintiff a decree of
divorce from defendant and awarded her certain real and
personal property.

Defendant was awarded certain personal

property and an equitable lien on the parties real property,
and was ordered to pay child support and the debts incurred
by the parties during their marriage except for the mortgage
upon the parties' real property.

Contrary to the statement

contained in Appellant's brief, defendant was not ordered to
oay alimony to the plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondant adopts Appellant's characterization of
the facts.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court except in regard to vesting of appellant's equity
in the parties' real property which respondent stipulates
may be amended to provide for vesting eighteen (18) months
following entry of the Decree of Divorce.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DEDUCTING FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S FAMILY FROM THE GROSS EQUITY IN THE PARTIES' REAL PROPERTY.
This Court recently described the standard applicable
to appeal of a trial courts division of property in a divorce
action as follows:
The trial court, in a divorce
action, has considerable latitude of
discretion in adjusting financial and
property interests. A party appealing
therefrom has the burden to prove there
was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error; or the evidence
clearly preponderated against the
findings; or such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. English v. English,
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
See also, Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491, 492 - 493 (Utah
1975) which applies the same standard verbatim.
Appellant attempts to meet this burden by arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in charging
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant with the payment of loans which were unenforceable
under the statute of limitations.

Specifically, the Court

found that plaintiff's family had loaned or counter-signed
for loans to the plaintiff in the approximate sum of $7,500.00
to help purchase and maintain the parties' real property.
This sum was deducted from the gross equity in that real
property and the balance was divided between the parties.
The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
The Twenty-four Hundred Dollars which
has been paid down on the house seems
to me, and I don't want to argue about
it at this point and I may change my
mind, but it seems to me that that
ought to be a deductible from the
equity, so that each of them are
responsible for half of it. And the
$395.00, there isn't any question
about that. The amount paid to her
mother for board and room or whatever
it was during the period they lived
there and the amounts advanced by her
father and brother for living expenses,
etc., it's true I think that if they
were bringing the action there would
be no recovery because I think it
would be barred by the statute of
limitations. On the other hand, in
awarding, because he's in school
studying diesel mechanics, etc., and
she's foregoing alimony, it seems to
me that maybe some kind of consideration ought to be made in awarding her
a little bit more of the equity in
that house than him under those circumstances, since her people apparently
have contributed more to it. (Tr.
84).

-3-
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This demonstrates that Appellant is wrong to characterize
the Court's action as charging him with the payment of unenforceable loans.

On

the contrary, these loans were treated

as contributions to the purchase and maintenance of the home
and the court was merely denying the defendant an equal share
of something to which he did not equally contribute.

If

these sums had been gifts or if the home had been inherited
from the plaintiff's family, the Court would clearly not
have abused its discretion in making such a deduction from
the gross equity.

Therefore, the technical enforceability

of these loans is completely irrelevant and the Appellant's
argument a misrepresentation of the trial court's actions.
The statute of limitations argument is immaterial
even if these contributions are viewed solely as loans.

The

mere fact that legal enforcement of these debts is time
barred affects only that remedy, not their inherent validity
or plaintiff's intent to repay them.

Plaintiff's unrebutted

testimony was that she regarded all such advances as loans
to be repaid as soon as possible.

(Tr. 12-19).

If these

loans are repaid, Respondent will have made a highly disproportionate contribution to that which Appellant demands be
shared equally.

The fundamental unfairness of that result

is obvious and renders the decision below the only distributior
which would avoid inequity.
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Appellant also fails to point out that certain of
these loans must be permitted in any event since they are
not barred by the statute of limitations.

For example, one

loan was from the plaintiff's brother, Ray Kier, and consists
of a written second mortgage upon the parties' home, signed
by both parties and recorded with the Uintah County Recorder.
(Tr. 14 - 15).

In another instance, respondant took a

personal loan from Zions Bank in Vernal to pay delinquent
mortgage payments and utility bills.

This loan is in respondant's

name alone, is co-signed by her father, E. L. "Jack" Kier, and
was due in April, 1978.

(Tr. 19).

Nor is it clear that

all remaining debts would be barred by the statute of limitations
since the evidence was that many advances were made in small
amounts over

11
•

•

the past five or six years. . . 11 (Tr.

14, line 2) and it is not possible to determine with accuracy
what sums were advanced beyond the statutory period.
Defendant at no time denied that these sums were
advanced by plaintiff's family.

He admitted that plaintiff's

father gave them money to use for a down-payment on their
first house, that plaintiff's mother gave them board and
room for approximately one year and that he signed the
second mortgage note to plaintiff's brother.

In regard to

the remainder he denied only that he was aware of the advances
or that he received any of it.

(Tr. 36 - 37).

Viewing

defendant's testimony as a whole, it is clear that his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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denial is based on a lack of knowledge, not a specific
awareness that any loan was not made.

The defendant simply

did not bother himself with the family's financial affairs
to such an extent he didn't even know how much money he made
when working for Tomahawk Trucking, his employment while the
parties resided in Vernal.

(Tr. 37).

The situation herein would be different if the
court had actually specified these debts and ordered the
defendant to assume responsibility for their payment.
the fact is, that the Court did not.

But

Instead, it merely

stated that it was not inclined to award the defendant half
the equity in something to which he did not equally contribute
Under the rule in English, Supra, this does not point to an
abuse of discretion or any other reason for reversing the
decision below.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT

ER..~

IN SIGNING THE FINDINGS OF

FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONTAINING PROVISIONS AT VARIANCE WITH THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Prior to and during trial the parties had discussed a formula for vesting defendant with any equity he
might be awarded in the parties' home and it was the impressic:,
I

of plaintiff's counsel that agreement had been reached that
such equity would become due and payable when plaintiff
remarried, sold the home, or the children both reached a
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certain age, whichever occurred first.

Defense counsel

himself proposed that formula at the hearing in an apparently unrecorded portion of the proceeding.

The Court's

subsequent Memorandum Decision provided for vesting of the
equity 18 months following the entry of the decree.

Plain-

tiff's counsel thought that the Court did not understand the
parties' agreement on this point and so contacted Judge Bullock
by phone who stated that if counsel for defendant agreed to
using the parties' formula the Court would go along.

The

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then drawn
according to the parties' formula and submitted to defense
counsel on February 6, 1978 with a cover letter indicating
the originals had not been sent pending his review and
approval.

Defense counsel did not respond and Judge Bullock

signed these papers on February 21, 1978.

Defense counsel

did eventually notify the plaintiff of his objection to the
modification in a letter dated March 28, 1978, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

Plaintiff replied

by letter on March 30, 1978, stipulating to restoring
the terms outlined in the Court's Memorandum Decision.

A

copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
Defense counsel made no response until filing of Appellant's
brief herein where it is alleged that plaintiff refused to
so stipulate.
The plaintiff's stipulation has not been withdrawn
and no objection is made at this time--or has been at any
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other time--to providing that defendant's equity shall
become due and payable 18 months following entry of the
Decree of Divorce as provided in the courts Memorandum
Decision.
SUMMARY
The decision of the trial court to deduct contributions from the plaintiff's family from the gross equity in
the parties' real property was not an abuse of discretion
and so must be sustained on appeal.

The Appellant's argument

that these deductions were improper because they reflected
debts barred by the statute of limitation is invalid because
the defendant was not being charged with payment of these
debts at all.

Rather, he was being denied a right to share

equally in something to which he did not equally contribute.
The Appellant has previously stipulated to a modification of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce to provide that defendant's equity in the parties'
real property shall vest 18 months following entry of the
Decree of Divorce so this is a point not in dispute at this
time.

Since the deduction of plaintiff's family's contri-

butions should not be reversed and plaintiff agreed to the
modification sought by defendant regarding vesting of the
equity awarded, costs should be awarded to the Respondant.
Respectfully submitted,

P. KEITH NELSON
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GEORGE R. SUTTON
Attorneys for Respondant
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
MAILING CETIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondant to Paul N.
Cotro-Manes, Attorney for Appellant, 430 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this
day of

-9-
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EXHIBIT "A"
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY

_Att,,rn~'tJ at of!aw
SUITE 430 JUDGE BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84111

PHONE (801) S31.1300
. COTRO-MANES (19:Z2-198°"')

p. N

COTRO-MANES

March 28, 1978

WILLIAM J. M. 0ALGLIESH

JOHN

c.

G"EEN

rE WARR

RANDY $. LUDLOW

~ FANKHAUSER

BRUCE W. SHAND

,~tH

N BEASLEY

George R. Sutton, Esq.
Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard & Tate
Attorneys at Law
48 P. 0. Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Dear Mr. Sutton:
We are in receipt of your letter of March 22, 1978, and the
enclosed stipulation.
As the matter has been appealed to the Supreme Court for
the State of Utah, we do not believe that the Court has
any jurisdiction to hear your proposed motion to modify
the decree of divorce.
With respect to the order to show cause for failure to
comply, we have advised our client immediately to make
sure that the blanket together with the photographs are
returned to Mrs. Robertson and that he get the child
support current.
You will recall that I talked with you relative to the decree
of divorce in the first place which was unilaterally
modified from the Judge's memorandum decision with respect
to the house and the equity therein. We never did hear
back from you relative to modifying the decree back to
what the Judge ruled in his memorandum decision.
My client does not wish to file a joint tax return, and we
do not believe that the court has jurisdiction to order
him to do so, as this is a matter involving the Internal
Revenue Service and the laws of the United States, and not
the divorce court.
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George R. Sutton,Esq.

Be it as it may, as the matter is on appeal, the Court has
no jurisdiction to modify its decree.
Very truly yours,
COTRO-MANES,
V)

~-

PNC:

jh

v

P~~l

WARR,
/

FANKHAUSER & BEASLE' I

!

/

- ~'., !.<l ~; . {d"'-1!, ,
N.

Cotro-Manes

,{
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EXHIBIT "B"
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, LEONARD & TATE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

~IRK W BENNETT

48 POST OFFICE PLACE

~csEAr w. BRANOT
.,. aNT CHMllSTOPHERSON
: ~ICK J. HAl..L

'OE-"NIS V. HASLAM

P. 0. BOX 2465

SALT LAKE: CITY, UTAH 64110

C£CIL R. HEDGER
~MICHAEL. JORGENSEN
~oeEAT w. MILLER
~ t'.EITH NELSON

(801)

531-1777

2'3•:> C01.o~ .. oo STATE E!!.Al'>I\ BLOC.
1600 E>i=iOAow.n

OENVEP.CO .. Oo:tAoo eczo2

1100

.,.,u,..

eun.. 01,..0

SU•TE 3'300
"'"OUSTON, TEXA~ 7700Z

500 Tt-IE ATAIU.'4

1200 N STREET

WILl..IAM S. RJCHAROS

March 30, 1978

,. I WIL\..l.A.M /'1. RUTTER
: I GEORGE A.SUTTON
I H~OMAS M. ZAR A

P. o. eox ezoza
UNCOLN, NEBRASKA 68501
820 NEl!llUS.U. SAVINGS &LOG.
1&23 ,.AANAM STREET
0""'AHA,NEl!AA5KA 5$102

SUITE 230

Mr. Paul N. Cotro-Manes
Attorney at Law
Suite 430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

1919 H STAEl!T N,W.

WASMl...OTON,O.c.zoooa

Robertson vs. Robertson

Dear Paul:
Responding to your letter of March 28, it is my impression
reading rule 73(d) that only a supersedeas bond will stay
a Judgment on appeal. If so, then the present decree is in
effect and therefore subject to modification. In addition, the
court retains jurisdiction over the divorce itself and can make
additional rulings it deems proper despite the appeal. Accordingly,
we intend to submit our petition at this time.
af~er

In regard to Don and Sherrie's income tax returns, I agree
that a Utah District Court cannot specify the manner in which a
Federal Income Tax Return shall be filed. Whether they file
jointly or separately might well be a moot point anyway since
their deductions could be great enough to result in a complete
refund of all withholding either way. However, I disagree that
the court has no authority over the refund. It is certainly our
intent to seek an award of the full amount or an equitable portion
thereof. Moreover, if Don does not want to file a joint return
so as to realize the greatest possible refund, you should advise
him that Sherrie will claim all deductions pertaining to the
house when filing her individual return. While so doing she will
advise the IRS that Don might also be claiming the same deductions,
but that she considers them to be rightfully hers alone. This
information would be provided for the sole purpose of eliminating
any su-spicion by the IRS of fraud or bad faith on her part.
Another matter has come up in the interim which we must
add to the Petition for Modification and the Order to Show Cause.
Last Saturday, March 25, an agent of the Salt Lake Teacher's Credit
Union appeared at Sherrie's house to repossess her car for nonpayment of a loan which she and Don took out to purchase a truck for
him some years back. Sherrie owned this automobile free and clear
at that time and they offered it as collateral. Defaults were
numerous and the truck was eventually repossessed but left an
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Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq.
March 30, 1978
Page 2

$800. 00 deficiency when resold. The car was not actually repos- I
sessed because it is not presently operable, and arrangements have!
now been made with the credit union to have Tex Gines assume
full responsibility for that loan in exchange for more time to
avoid repossession. Since under the terms of the decree this is!
Don's debt, we will ask that the court charge this balance to his,
equity in the house and relieve him of further responsibility.
At the same time, we will ask the court to caution Don about
possible future contempt for failure to pay these debts pursu~t
to the decree.
Finally, I disagree that our modification of the judge's
decree was "unilateral". I was suprised when I read that
provision in Judge Bullock's Memorandum Decision since, to my
recollection, your proposals regarding the house equity throughout the trial were those which we wrote into the final decree.
As such, this struck me as a misunderstanding on the judge's part
To insure that was the case I sent you a copy of all the proposed.
documents for your review and corranent before sending the original1
to the judge. I also stated the date when I would mail the
original so you could comment before that time, but heard nothini
from you until some time later. Your lack of response lead me to
assume that you had no objection. Be that as it may, we have no
serious objection to going back to the judge's original idea
regarding the equity and will so stipulate if you will draw up
the necessary papers.

I

Since it appears that we will at least have to argue whether
the court has authority to modify its decree while the appeal
is pending, I would again request that you sign the stipulation
allowing these hearings to be held in Provo and return it to
me within five (5) days of this letter. Otherwise, I will schedu
the hearing for Vernal at the earliest opportunity.

I

Sincerely,

NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE

George Sutton
Attorney at Law
GRS: clj
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